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This paper examines the structural forces behind South Korean women workers’ labor
activism in the 1970s, an era of rapid export-oriented industrialization. Most of the
labor strikes initiated by women occurred in the labor-intensive manufacturing sector,
and they were in sharp contrast to the overall labor quiescence of male workers during
the same period. The experiences of South Korean women refute widely held assump-
tions about the docility of Asian women workers. This case study suggests that women
rebel when their lives undergo drastic changes under a set of antagonistic structural
transformations. Women dialectically interact with the capitalist-patriarchal structure
as conscious human agents, and the result of such interaction is their gender- and
class-based collective resistance.
INTRODUCTION
South Korea’s “economic miracle” has been phenomenal. One of the
“Four Asian Tigers” (along with Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan), the
nation’s GNP grew by an annual average of 7 percent in the 1970s. Until
quite recently, many policy makers believed that Korea’s “export-oriented
industrialization”(henceforth, EOI) was a useful model for other developing
economies to emulate.1 For a nation with poor natural resource endowment,
limited domestic market potential, and dearth of capital, EOI was an effec-
tive development strategy for decades. South Korea concentrated its well-
educated and highly disciplined labor force into the labor-intensive manu-
facturing sector as a way to gain and enjoy a competitive advantage in
international markets (Barret and Chin, 1987). Under the strong leadership
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of an authoritarian regime, South Korea succeeded in leaving poverty
behind. However, economic success affected men and women differently.
Korea’s state-driven capitalist industrialization was a gendered process, and
women resisted.
One of the ironies of South Korea’s “economic miracle” was the co-exis-
tence of phenomenal growth and women’s labor resistance. Women initiat-
ed labor strikes at a time when labor activism was severely repressed, and
this behavior was always in sharp contrast to male workers’ overall labor
inactivity during the 1970s (Lee, 1997: 154). “Militant” and “radical” have
been the primary adjectives used to describe female activism (Hamilton,
1986). Also, women’s activism was a clear violation of the patriarchal cul-
ture’s rigid gender norms. This paper attempts to explain why South
Korean women, and not men, were at the forefront of labor strikes in the
1970s. I argue that South Korean women resisted a set of antagonistic struc-
tural changes that abruptly altered their lives during the period of rapid
industrialization. Women rebel when their lives undergo drastic changes in
the milieu of gendered structural transformation.
This paper hypothesizes that the social phenomenon under observation
(women’s resistance) can be explained by their lived experiences (class- and
gender-based oppression) with the intervening variables of macro social
transformation (urbanization and increased labor participation) and the
existence of outside support groups. This paper attempts to demystify the
glossy portrayal of economic growth by viewing the challenging work lives
of women workers and their subsequent labor resistance. The impressive
macro economic indicators did not mean much when the numbers were not
translated into qualitative improvement in workers’ welfare. Although the
export regime euphemized women workers in the export industry as “the
industrial warriors,” they had to endure extremely hard work and gendered
humiliation on the shop floor. The degrading social stigma as powerless,
poor, under-educated, rural, young, and female, was another salient source
of their discontent. Their lived experiences were in great congruence with
the nation’s social change. The increase in young women’s labor participa-
tion and urban migration was in step with the country’s structural transfor-
mation. The export-oriented industrialization needed a cheap and skilled
labor force, and women filled the need. The rapid urbanization also meant
their radical uprooting from their hometowns. This group of socially mar-
ginal women workers whose lives were at the juncture of overall social
change experienced empowerment from the daily oppression, the shared
camaraderie, the resistance experiences, and the outside support.
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WOMEN WORKERS’ PASSIVE RESISTANCE: A DOMINANT NORM?
Most comparative studies of women’s labor resistance present a passive
picture of women. Studies on Asian women in particular consistently sug-
gest passive resistance as a dominant norm. Gallin (1990) describes the
“muting of class consciousness” by Taiwanese women workers. She argues
that women workers are inactive because of the dispersal of factories into
rural areas, the influence of a patriarchal family structure, the state’s repres-
sive labor policies, and women workers’ identification with the company
rather than with fellow workers. In addition, Ehrenreich and Fuentes (1985),
and Lin (1986) have described Southeast Asian women workers’ unusual
forms of resistance in the electronics industry. Southeast Asian women’s
mass hysteria, such as collapses and sudden outbursts, seems to reflect a
lack of resistance strategy. Elson and Pearson (1981) and Hossfeld (1990)
note Asian women workers’ ingenuous but passive resistance against patri-
archal management. Women workers mimic and ridicule male supervisors
in their absence, replacing their usual expressions of respect and deference.
Elson and Pearson (1981: 27) observe that “... this passivity is not a natural
and original state: to achieve it requires enormous efforts of self-repression.”
Bose and Acosta-Belen (1995: 5) also argue for women’s passive resistance
by stating that “women’s survival itself is an act of resistance.” Thus, pas-
sive resistance has been argued to be the dominant mode of Asian women
workers’ labor struggles.
In contrast to these claims of women’s passive resistance, there exists sub-
stantial evidence of women’s labor activism. Enloe (1989: 169-174) describes
an incident of collective action by Mexican women. In 1985, a severe earth-
quake in Mexico City destroyed about 800 small garment shops, causing
significant losses of workers’ lives and property. The value of women work-
ers in the capitalist system became evident when rescue workers attempted
to salvage sewing machines before they rescued the women. After this acci-
dent, the Mexican women garment workers organized a union, formed a
coalition with middle class women, and subsequently won several key con-
cessions such as the provision of day care centers. Tilly (1986) also chal-
lenges the women’s passive resistance paradigm by noting the pivotal role
of French women workers during the highly agitated labor unrest in the
19th century tobacco industry. Tilly sees the changes in women’s roles as
members of an emerging proletariat class in the industrialization process as
the primary cause for their labor activism. Similarly, Mies (1988) describes
Indian peasant women’s active resistance against caste-based exploitation in
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the 1970s. Lower-caste peasant women had long suffered unjust treatment,
including unlawful eviction from their homes and brutal physical attacks by
upper-caste landlords and police. As a way to protect them from such
exploitation, women in the ‘Harijian’ caste (untouchables) successfully orga-
nized fieldwork groups. Mies writes, “they showed an astonishing degree of
assertiveness and militancy and a great capacity for clear-headed analysis of
their problems and working out solutions. This assertiveness was not an
inborn quality of the Harijian women, but was the outcome of their work,
their awareness of its importance for the survival of their family, and of the
fact that they had to live by the work of their own hands” (Mies, 1988: 140).
Along with these cross-national examples, South Korean women’s labor
resistance in the 1970s debunks the “straw woman” argument of women’s
inherent passivity. Passive resistance simply is not the dominant mode of
women’s labor struggles (Fonow, 1998; Irons, 1998; Tinsman, 2000).2
THE GENDERED TRAJECTORY OF SOUTH KOREA’S EOI
Women workers face the “double jeopardy” of patriarchy and capitalism
in the milieu of global economic restructuring. Expansion of capitalism on a
global scale and preexisting social norms of patriarchy produce a unique
balancing act by mutually reinforcing each other’s ideological manifesta-
tions (Hartmann, 1976, 1981). The international division of labor and the
mobility of capital accrue salient empirical implications for women’s lives in
the developing economies (Barkin, 1985; Tiano, 1995; Ward, 1986).
A symbiotic relationship that formed between capitalism and patriarchy
transformed women into workers in South Korea’s industrialization
process. South Korea’s rapid economic growth in quantitative terms did not
bring about fair and equitable improvement for the general populace. The
government-led EOI resulted in a massive influx of low-paid and easy-to-
exploit women workers into labor-intensive industries. In addition, rapid
urbanization was accompanied by the stagnation of rural areas. These con-
sequences of South Korea’s uneven economic development had serious
implications for women’s lives (Roh, 1994; Park, 2001: 855-859). This section
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2 The author acknowledges the cases of non-resistance or passive resistance in other export-
oriented industries such as Indonesia and Thailand. My speculation for these differences is
that these cases may lack the explanatory variables this paper uses, such as oppression
embedded in the women’s daily lives (e.g., the shop floor, dormitory, and the degrading
social stigma). The same speculation can be made about the intervening variables, such as the
radical structural transformation (e.g., urbanization and drastic increase in the demand for
women’s work) and the existence of consciousness raising support groups from outside (e.g.,
the Urban Industrial Mission).
specifically aims to show that Korea’s development trajectory was a gen-
dered process. Women’s lives situated in that particular structural position
and historical milieu were interwoven with their consciousness raising and
subsequent resistance. This section does not attempt to provide the direct
causal explanation between women’s oppression and their resistance.
Rather, it aims to provide a mediating link between macro social change and
women’s lived lives. Situating women in a certain structural position helps
us to be aware of the historical milieu of their times and to connect such
milieu to their life experiences.
The Increase in Women’s Participation in the Labor Market
Women’s labor force participation increased substantially during Korea’s
EOI process. A significant number of women became paid workers in the
1960s and 1970s. The proportion of women in the labor force, for instance,
climbed from 28.7 percent in 1960 to 35.2 percent in 1970, and it increased
again to 36.6 percent in 1980. This substantial increase in female labor force
participation reflects the crucial importance of women’s work to the Korean
economy’s initial take-off in the 1960s.
The increase in women’s labor force participation meant the rising impor-
tance of their work in various industrial sectors. Women’s labor participa-
tion in secondary manufacturing, for instance, rose from 21.1 percent in
1960, to 27.9 percent in 1970, and then to 30.3 percent in 1980. At the same
time, the proportion of women engaging in agricultural production activi-
ties grew from 30.1 percent in 1960 to 40.8 percent in 1970, and then to 44.2
percent in 1980. Women thus emerged as major members of the new prole-
tariat class in South Korea’s economy.
Despite the substantial increase in women’s employment in the manufac-
turing sector, the majority of women were concentrated in labor-intensive
peripheral industries. Due to the sexual division of labor, most women were
excluded from the capital-intensive sector. As in other societies, insecure
employment, low skill levels, low wages, and lack of career mobility charac-
terized the labor-intensive industries of South Korea. For instance, the pro-
portion of women workers in capital-intensive industries in South Korea
was only 15.2 percent in 1960, 22.0 percent in 1970, and 19.3 percent in 1980.
Yet the proportion of women workers in labor-intensive industries was 50.3
percent in 1960, 57.5 percent in 1970, and 57.3 percent in 1980. As a result,
women workers in labor-intensive industries lacked many of the privileges
that the male workers in the capital-intensive industries enjoyed such as
secure employment, high wages, and upward career mobility.
The sexual division of labor between labor-intensive and capital-intensive
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industries increased as time progressed. For instance, 42.2 percent of appar-
el manufacturing workers were female in 1960, but this number grew to 69.1
percent in 1970 and to 76.7 percent in 1980. The gender composition of occu-
pational categories within manufacturing suggests that women were mostly
spinners, weavers, knitters, sewers, food processors, rubber footwear mak-
ers, wig makers, and electronics assembly workers (Ministry of Labor, 1979).
However, women were an absolute minority of workers within all capital-
intensive industries except pharmaceutical manufacturing. The manufactur-
ing of industrial machinery, for instance, had the lowest share of female
workers with 1.1 percent in 1960. In 1973, shipbuilding had the lowest share
of female workers with 3.1 percent. Occupational prestige of women work-
ers within the manufacturing sector was considerably lower than that of
male workers.
Despite the significant contribution made by women workers to South
Korea’s economic growth, the economic rewards they received for their
work were minimal compared to those of male workers (Koo, Haggard, and
Deyo, 1986: 67). For example, holding educational level constant, women
workers in manufacturing received about 56 percent of the wages paid to
their male counterparts in 1978 (Kim, 1984: 65).3 Compared to other Asian
newly industrializing countries such as Singapore and Hong Kong, the
wage differential between men and women has been highest in South Korea
(Park, 1993: 133).4 These gender-biased wages are closely related to the
patriarchal norm of treating women as secondary wage earners.5 The major-
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3 Wage policy was determined at a factory level by discriminatory work assignments given
to women workers, and entailed less managerial authority and promotion possibilities. Very
few women were assigned to the managerial positions on the shop floor as team leader and
foreman. The factory regime believed that the paternalistic male figures would be more suit-
able to lead the young women workers. Women’s less important and less prestigious work
assignments as compared to their male counterparts was used to justify their lower wage
level. Non-job related considerations in determining a worker’s wage such as the number of
dependents, marital status, and military service led to substantial wage discrepancy between
male and female workers as well.
4 Wage differences between other Asian countries and Korea seem to be positively associat-
ed with the degree of patriarchal beliefs. Women’s socio-economic status seems to reflect the
value they carry as members of society and workforce.
5 The empirical reality of women workers was that they were often the primary provider for
their families in the rural areas. They often financed their male siblings’ education as well.
Contrary to this reality, the management treated women workers as if they were secondary
breadwinners. Reasons for this discrepancy lied within the patriarchal norms that young
women were supposed to be dependent on their parents and protected by male siblings.
Normatively, they could be neither self-sufficient nor providing. Capitalists took advantage of
these norms by framing the young women workers as secondary earners whose work carried
less social importance than men’s. Therefore, they could justify less compensation for the 
ity of South Korean women workers in the labor-intensive manufacturing
sector were single, in their early 20s, and from rural backgrounds. Very few
of them were economically dependent on their families. Despite earning
subsistence wages, some women still managed to remit a significant portion
of their wages to their families (Koo, 1987). These women’s economic inde-
pendence as quasi-primary wage earners was not reflected in their econom-
ic rewards. Although women worked longer hours than men, they were
paid less. In addition, women worked an average of 245 hours per month in
1984, as opposed to 241 hours for men. This meant that women worked 10.2
hours a day, in excess of the 8 hour working day regulation, while men
averaged 10 hours daily (Park, 1993: 133-134). Economic logic alone cannot
explain these gaps. Gender ideology played a part in determining the eco-
nomic value of women’s work. Quite simply, women could be worked
longer and cheaper.
Women’s Urban Migration
Park Chung Hee’s authoritarian regime (1961-1979) believed in economies
of scale by concentrating manufacturing facilities in a few geographical
locations. This sort of industrial policy created a large pool of migrant
women workers who left rural areas to get jobs in the cities. This in-migra-
tion to major industrial centers such as the Seoul, Busan, and Daegu metro-
politan areas was phenomenal, creating significant out-migration from rural
areas. The annual growth rate of in-migration to the metropolitan areas
averaged about 20 percent in the 1960s and 1970s. By contrast, the out-
migration from the agricultural areas in Chung-Buk, Chung-Nam, Jeon-Buk,
and Jeon-Nam Provinces averaged 7 percent from 1960 to 1980 (Economic
Planning Board, 1963, 1973, 1983). As we will see below, this process of
rapid urbanization had a more significant impact on Korean women than on
the general population.
Women who remained in rural areas became a major agricultural work
force. For example, in the 1960s, the growth rate of the economically active
female population in rural areas experienced a dramatic 48.2 percent
increase. This feminization of the agricultural population continued until
the 1970s, with a 4.7 percent increase of economically active women in rural
areas, while the male population shrank by 7.8 percent. Women filled the
void left by out-migrated agricultural male labor in the process of rapid
urbanization.
Substantial numbers of women also migrated to the cities. Married
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women’s work.
women moved to urban areas as members of family units, and they were
often absorbed into the informal urban economy. Significantly, young
women between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four had the highest urban
migration rate, in comparison with women and men in all other age groups.
Women in the same age bracket composed 40.1 percent of the total popula-
tion that migrated into urban areas during 1966 and 1970. During 1971 and
1975, the same group had the highest urbanization rate, comprising 48.5
percent of the total migration to urban areas. In 1976, 48.2 percent of the
people who moved to urban areas were women between the ages of fifteen
and twenty-four. Young women migrants in the most productive age brack-
et thus became a major part of the rising proletariat class in South Korea’s
industrializing economy.
This influx of young women into the urban sector had two important
implications. The first was an increase in demand for an abundant supply of
cheap and easily exploitable industrial labor. The second was the rational
calculation of the economic value of their daughters by parents. Greenhalgh
(1985: 276) writes that “Put badly, the parents’ key strategy was to take more
from daughters to give more to sons and thus get more for themselves ...
whereas traditionally daughters could repay their parents only by helping
around the house. Now daughters could repay their debt — and repay it
fully — by working outside the home and remitting their wages to their
parents [emphasis in original].” There exists compelling evidence of young
factory women’s monetary contributions to rural families. In a survey of
factory women in Korea’s Daegu-Gumi industrial complex, an average of 21
percent of young female factory workers’ total income was remitted to par-
ents in rural areas (Koo, 1987). South Korea’s rapid urbanization thus result-
ed in an unprecedentedly high increase in women’s urban migration. There
was a strong pull for women’s labor. There was also a push from the parents
who desired their daughters’ monetary contributions to the family. Girls
from rural areas became the factory girls of the cities, who were often
euphemized as the “industrial warriors” of the nation (Lee, 1990).6
The phenomenal economic growth of South Korea involved human costs.
Women’s lives and their work were fundamentally transformed in the sys-
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6 Korean workers were often called “industrial warriors,” fighting for the nation’s industri-
alization, on the “export front.” A female worker of Dong-Il Textile wrote the following poem,
conveying her skepticism against this euphoria: Drinking a Cup of Hot Coffee/I drink a cup
of hot coffee/Dispensed from a vending machine./A cup of coffee and one tablet of Timing
awaken my tired body./My head feels numb,/My exhaustion feels numb,/and the passage of
time feels numb./Would a cup of coffee and a tablet of Timing qualify me/As an industrial
warrior?/The industrial warrior who has to work/All the time (Jung, 1985: 83).
tem of capitalism and patriarchy. Women workers were a major “cog” of the
engine of South Korea’s economic growth, yet their contribution has been
consistently underestimated. Behind the glamorous image of South Korea’s
economic success lie the hardships experienced by women workers.
SOUTH KOREAN WOMEN WORKERS’ LABOR RESISTANCE IN THE
1970S: THREE HISTORICAL CASES
South Korean women’s engagement in labor strikes has been viewed as
idiosyncratic in consideration of the Confucian cultural context, which pre-
scribes Korea’s rigid gender norms. Asian women have in general been
stereotyped as meek and submissive (Gelb and Palley, 1994; Kim, 1997;
Tiano, 1994: 3-6; Young, 1987). This stereotyping often obscures the empiri-
cal reality. Choi (1989: 65), for instance, notes that “women workers in Korea
have been as important to the union movement as they have been to the
production process.” Lee (1987: 71) writes that “gender is an important
explanatory variable for the variations in labor markets and the labor move-
ment in Korea.” Deyo (1989: 190) also emphasizes that “if young female
workers rarely engage in well-organized collective action, they do engage in
protests and demonstrations. South Korean female textile workers were at
the center of worker protests during South Korea’s recent political crisis.”
The intensity and importance of South Korean women’s labor resistance
thus refutes the stereotype of Asian women’s docility.
In order to grasp an overall picture of women-initiated labor activism, I
will briefly describe three exemplary strikes that occurred in the 1970s.7
Labor strikes were common in Korea during the 1970s and 1980s. This
explosion of strikes can be explained as the manifestations of “rising politi-
cal expectation” after the loosening of the tight social control exercised by
the Park Chung Hee regime (Kim-Park, 1997). All three occurred at labor-
intensive firms employing more than 1,000 workers at the time of the strike,
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TABLE 1. ANNUAL LABOR DISPUTES, 1970-1980
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
(A) 4 10 0 0 58 52 49 58 102 105 206
(B) 541 832 0 0 22,609 10,256 657 7,975 10,598 14,258 4,897
(A) is the frequency of annual labor disputes and (B) is the number of strikers.
Source: Ministry of Labor. 1983. Year Book of Labor Statistics.
7 For other sources with more descriptions, see Han (1991) and Chungsa Pyungjipbu (1984).
and the absolute majority of the strikers involved were women. All of the
strikes were at “the cornerstone of the Korean labor movement,” resulting
in large-scale reactions from the general populace and significant political
transformations (Lee, 1987). These three cases have been chosen not because
of strict comparability among them, but because of their importance to the
Korean labor movement (Choi, 1989; Lee, 1990). Each case illuminates the
gendered dynamics of Korea’s development process, such as the sexual
division of labor, work discrimination against women, patriarchal manage-
ment practices, and a repressive labor regime. These dynamics were not
manifested in uniform fashion in all three of the cases. For instance, patriar-
chal management practices showed a stronger presence in one case, while
the repressive labor regime did so in another case.
The following historical accounts are from the Dismissed Workers
Association of Dong-Il Textile (1985), the Electing Committee for the Jeon
Tae Il Monument (1983), the Korean National Christian Council (1984), and
Kim-Park (1998). These sources convey the details of the events by drawing
heavily on the strike participants’ narratives, women workers’ personal
writings, and officially banned underground materials. Alternative data
sources such as newspaper articles, public opinion polls, and government
statements exist in forms not warranting a systematic analysis, or do not
exist at all. The severe government censorship against the mass media, con-
ducted out of fear of losing foreign investment and spreading anti-govern-
ment sentiment, resulted in this absence of public data (cf. Daehwa, 1977).
The Peace Market Protest (1970)
The Chonggye garment makers’ sweatshops were established in Seoul in
1961. As of 1970, several hundred small workshops located at a giant gar-
ment center called the Peace Market were employing about 20,000 workers,
and these small shops supplied 70 percent of the total domestic garment
demand. Many provisions of the national labor law were not applicable to
the Peace Market workers because most of the small shops employed an
average of 16 workers. The unionization of several hundred small work-
shops under a single union was long deemed improbable, and the absence
of a labor union worsened the owners’ violation of workers’ legal rights.
There was a strict sexual division of labor on the shop floor as well. The
absolute majority of the Peace Market garment makers were young women
between the ages of twelve and twenty-four, with a small proportion of
male workers. Most of the cutters were men, while most of the rippers who
did pressing, ironing, and delivery of thread and buttons to seamstresses
were women. Even though the role of ripper was more crucial to the pro-
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duction process than that of cutter, the work of the rippers was considered
“miscellaneous” by the owners. As a consequence, women workers earned
less than half of the average male worker’s wage.
Working conditions at the Peace Market were inhumane. The owners
divided each room into two-story compartments in order to maximize the
workspace. As a result, the workers had to work in small compartments
that typically measured 3 feet from floor to ceiling. The sweatshops were
called “attics” or “beehives” because of this building structure. Throughout
the 13-16 hour workday, workers could not stand upright because of this
space arrangement. The working environment was also hazardous. There
was little ventilation, lighting was poor, and the workers were constantly
exposed to the toxic chemical odors coming from the stacks of textiles.
There were high numbers of job-related illnesses. According to a survey at
the Peace Market in 1970, 96 out of 129 sample workers suffered from ail-
ments traceable to their work (largely tuberculosis), and 103 out of 129 suf-
fered from indigestion due to nervous tension. Workers with job-related ill-
nesses could not complain for fear of layoffs. Furthermore, their ailments
were not defined as occupational hazards due to a narrow, legalistic defini-
tion.
The labor protests at the Peace Market were sparked by the suicide of a
young worker in November, 1970. He set himself on fire while shouting,
“Workers are human beings, too!” He resorted to this violent act only after
repeatedly failing to draw attention to the inhumane working conditions at
the market. This shocking incident made the women workers more aware of
their rights, alarmed the general public, and brought about active student
participation in the labor movement. A labor union, the Chonggye Garment
Union, was formed at the market after the worker’s suicide. The govern-
ment officially recognized the union in the same month. The workers’
protests at the Peace Market were in reaction to labor exploitation and the
deprivation of basic workers’ rights. Although this incident was instigated
by one male worker’s violent death, it illuminated the hard lives of the pri-
marily women workers at the garment center, which were hidden behind
the rosy picture of national growth.
The Dong-Il Textile Strikes (1976-1980)
In 1980, 250 men and 1,100 women were employed at Dong-Il Textile in
the city of Incheon. Dong-Il was one of the pioneer Korean textile export
firms of the 1950s. Its primary manufacturing items were yarn and thread.
Koreans regained ownership of the company from the Japanese in 1946, and
Dong-Il has been one of the leading textile and apparel manufacturers in
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Korea ever since. Similar to the Peace Market, Dong-Il maintained a strict
sexual division of labor on the shop floor. The workers were divided into
two groups: highly educated and well paid male workers, and less educated
and poorly paid female workers. Women had to work three shifts, while
their male counterparts worked two shifts. Most promotion opportunities
were given to male workers, while women were blocked from upward
mobility. Beatings and verbal abuse of women workers by the shop floor
male leaders were common.
In 1972, women union members at the company voted out the male union
leaders, and elected a woman leader. The members had long been discon-
tented with the male leadership, which had never represented the needs of
the female majority. Their outside ally, a liberation theology-based church
group, the Urban Industrial Mission, assisted the women in electing a
woman representative (Mindy, 2001).8 After this change, the Dong-Il man-
agement refused to deal with the union because the management did not
regard the female-led union as an equal partner. The male managers and
production workers also found the new union leaders unacceptable. A hos-
tile gender division between female union members and male anti-unionists
emerged at the factory. Despite this antagonistic environment, the union
succeeded in providing its members with their legally prescribed rights,
such as sufficient meal breaks, which had not been implemented at the fac-
tory before.
Another union election was held in 1976, and the management resorted to
various underhanded tactics in an attempt to dissolve the female-led union.
In addition to buying votes and making threats, the management also used
violence against the women members. On the day of the election, pro-man-
agement male workers physically assaulted women workers who had come
to the union office to vote. The management also nailed the factory dormito-
ry shut in order to prevent its residents from voting. They cut off the elec-
tricity and water supply to the dormitory as well. Some of the confined
women kicked the dormitory door open, while others jumped out of the
four-story building. At this point, the workers went on strike.
The Dong-Il strike began as a peaceful and legitimate demonstration.
However, it turned into a full-scale hunger strike after the police arrested
several members. After three days of confrontation between riot police and
the hunger strikers, the fully armed riot police moved in to disperse the
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8 The Urban Industrial Mission (UIM) began factory evangelism in the city of Incheon in the
early 1960s, and soon became an active advocate of workers’ rights. The UIM provided tangi-
ble assistance to workers’ strikes, such as religious justifications, strategy consultation, and
legal assistance (Korean National Church Council, 1979).
strikers. As the police were advancing, one of the women shouted, “They
won’t touch us if we undress ourselves. Nobody would touch a woman’s
naked body.” So the strikers started to undress. This was a spontaneous act,
but it was to no avail. The riot police and the male factory workers dragged
away the half-naked and physically weak women by their hair. During this
violent crackdown, a total of twenty-seven women workers were impris-
oned on charges of creating a public disturbance. Fifty women passed out
from shock, more than seventy were wounded, and fourteen had to be hos-
pitalized due to serious injuries. Two were admitted to a psychiatric ward
due to severe mental shock.
A compromise between the management and the union was unattainable
after such violence. Male workers continued to function as members of
“goon squads” during union meetings.9 To make the situation worse, the
National Textile Workers’ Union (NTWU) refused to mediate the dispute by
defining the Dong-Il Textile union as the troublemaker. In the absence of an
institutional recourse, the women workers continued their labor resistance
by changing their strike site from the factory to a variety of public places.
They interrupted a live radio broadcast, which was celebrating National
Labor Day, and staged a hunger strike at a Catholic church located in the
heart of downtown Seoul. They continued to agitate for the release of their
imprisoned union leaders in various public sites, and more workers were
arrested and imprisoned by the repressive national government. Their
struggle ended in 1980 with the rise of a new military dictatorship.
Y.H. Trading (1979)
Y.H. Trading was a wig exporter that greatly benefited from the explosive
U.S. demand for hairpieces in the 1960s. The company started with 10 work-
ers in 1966 and expanded to 4,000 workers by 1970. The business began to
decline in the mid-1970s due to a reduced demand from the U.S., which was
the company’s major export market. This change in market conditions led to
a massive dismissal of workers. As a way to sustain its profit level, the com-
pany also started subcontracting with independent suppliers.
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9 As female union leadership was preparing for another election in 1978, a group of male
anti-unionists at Dong-Il Textile attacked the union office with buckets full of human excre-
ment. They indiscriminately plastered excrement on the women workers who were there to
vote. The male intruders shouted, “This is what you deserve.” The women dispersed, crying
and screaming. As union members were running away from this unexpected attack, their
assailants followed them to the dormitory room. The police did not intervene. Upon a request
by union members to stop the attack, they responded, “Shut up, you bitches. We will wait
around a little bit longer” (Kim-Park, 1998: 12-13).
In 1979, the company announced the shutdown of its main plant. This
decision meant not only a loss of livelihood for the women workers, but it
also threatened the well-being of their parents and siblings in the rural
areas, who were partially dependent on the women’s financial support. The
laid off workers were infuriated with the management when they learned
that the company was continuing its operation by utilizing subcontractors.
In April 1979, the union demanded the normalization of the factory’s opera-
tions and launched a sit-in strike. Despite the workers’ repeated efforts to
gain legal redress, none of the government offices or the National Textile
Workers’ Union wanted to get involved with the Y.H. strike.10
The strike continued until the management cut off the water and electrici-
ty supply to the factory dormitory on August 6, 1979. The strikers then
moved their protest venue from the factory to the auditorium of the nation-
al opposition party. This move was designed to draw public support for
their issues. As a result, the Y.H. labor strike became a national news story,
and it generated a sympathetic reaction from the general populace. Two
days after the workers changed their strike site, hundreds of riot police
invaded the building and arrested everybody present. The scene was
described as “a battlefield.” The police dragged out the strikers, and the
entire area was under police control in 23 minutes. One woman worker was
killed and many were injured in this crackdown.
These cases do not uniformly share internal dynamics regarding the
beginning, the unfolding development, and consequences of the protests.
They cannot be strictly compared with each other. However, we can find
similar factors underlying the three cases. These factors are the sexual divi-
sion of labor in the workplace, work discrimination against women, patriar-
chal management practices, and a repressive labor regime. These incidents
illustrate the diverse forms of labor control that the women experienced.
Sexual division of labor on the shop floor was a common practice, and insti-
tutional recourse did not exist. Patriarchal management and misogynic male
workers expressed uncontrolled hostility towards women workers. The
authoritarian regime was also an active participant in women’s repression.
The practices of labor control were pervasive, and the means of control were
diverse.
An important observation we can make about these cases is the politiciza-
tion of labor strikes. The labor strikes were often framed as anti-dictatorship
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10 Korean labor unions had three hierarchical apparatuses: the national level union
(Federation of Korean Trade Unions), industry level unions (e.g., National Textile Workers’
Union), and enterprise level unions.
resistance and pro-democracy movements. The disputes at Dong-Il and Y.H.
Trading peaked during the period of political schism. The protest cycle
became faster, and protestors were more radicalized when the repressive
labor regime loosened its controlling grip. This suggests that political facili-
tation is conducive to challenging actions (Kim-Park, 1994). The politiciza-
tion of the 1970s’ labor strikes suggests that the nature of those resisting
actions was a pro-democracy movement. The repressive labor regime was a
very important target for their pursuit of justice.11
LABOR CONTROL MECHANISMS
South Korean factory women lived within a culture of oppression. The
authoritarian labor regime of Park Chung Hee severely sanctioned any chal-
lenges from labor. Not surprisingly, the co-opted unions and anti-labor leg-
islation failed to give voice to women’s legitimate concerns. Patriarchal prej-
udice led to abuse of women workers on the shop floor. The ideologies of
political authoritarianism, capitalism, and patriarchy were interwoven in
the creation of the oppressive culture.
The Repressive Labor Regime
A state-capital alliance formed to enhance economic development provid-
ed a firm foundation for the exploitation of workers in South Korea.
Political exclusion of labor is one of the most common features of the newly
industrializing countries of Asia (Deyo, 1989; Koo, Haggard, and Deyo,
1986). The Park regime of South Korea was involved in almost all aspects of
social, political, and economic life. The state desired to secure the political
legitimacy of a military junta through the improvement of economic condi-
tions, while capitalists simultaneously sought profits. In this political
power-capital alliance, the repression of labor was essential to the survival
of the system (Johnson, 1987; Lim, 1985).
As we have seen, women comprised a crucial majority of workers in the
highly profitable and labor-intensive export manufacturing sector during
South Korea’s EOI. Considering the importance of the export sector, the
state’s actions to control women’s work were inevitable. For instance, gov-
ernment officials described women’s strikes as “factory girls’ group hyste-
ria” (Foreign Broadcast Information System, 1978). The police physically
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11 Women’s movement in South Korea increased its velocity and expanded its constituen-
cies as the society as a whole was moving towards political democracy after 1987. Other civic
movements such as the environment movement, NGOs, and local autonomy began to blos-
som.
assaulted Dong-Il Textile strikers while dispersing them. Moreover, the
strikebreakers deployed by the companies (called “Company Security
Guards”) often utilized brutal physical force against women strikers with
the implicit consent of the state police (Lee, 1987). The Y.H. strike effectively
illuminates the close link between the authoritarian political power and
labor repression. The labor regime’s operation was gendered.
Anti-Labor Legislation and Co-opted Labor Unions
In the 1970s, labor control was legitimated as a way to tighten national
security. For example, the “Law Concerning Special Measures for
Safeguarding National Security,” was promulgated in 1971, and prohibited
labor organizing. The enactment of such laws was justified as an appropri-
ate security measure against the Communist North. The capitalist South
took advantage of anti-Communist phobia to justify its repressive rule. The
government framed labor strikes not only as challenges to local manage-
ment, but as threats to national security as well. First-hand intervention by
the government in labor disputes was legitimated. In most cases, govern-
ment arbitration of labor-management relations resulted in the deprivation
of workers’ rights because of the government’s pro-management bias (Kim,
1987).
The ways in which national and local labor unions operated within the
boundaries of these state regulations failed to reflect the union members’
interests (Choi, 1989; Deyo, 1989). The national and regional union leader-
ship’s co-optation was reminiscent of Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy,” in
which the institution of the labor union itself becomes a part of the status
quo (Michels, 1962). These deficiencies of union operation had more serious
drawbacks for women workers, who were concentrated in the peripheral
industrial sectors. The union’s bargaining agendas under male leadership
were insensitive to the female members’ needs. The strikes at the Peace
Market and Dong-Il Textile effectively demonstrate the workers’ enthusiasm
for fair union representation and frustration with the ineffectiveness of male
representatives.
Patriarchal Management Practices
Manifestations of patriarchal management practices were not confined to
tangible gender-based discrimination. The management’s gender-based
practices were both subtle and pervasive throughout everyday interactions.
According to Koo (1987), a national survey of women workers in sixteen
industries shows that 31 percent of the respondents cited “no human
respect by the management” as the most significant source of grievance.
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Other sources were “poor wages” (30 percent), “strenuous work” (22 per-
cent), “no time to attend night school” (7 percent), “no close relationship
with co-workers” (5 percent), and “poor dormitory facilities” (1 percent).
Male managers’ occasional beatings of women workers were a dramatic
example of “no human respect” for the women workers on the shop floor
(Lee, 1987).
Management also used the most profoundly damaging form of labor con-
trol: sexual violence. Sexual violence is a calculated means to express power
dominance and exploit women in a goal-specific manner. Jung (1993) writes
about male bosses’ use of sexual coercion to immobilize women workers in
the textile industry when the production quota is pressed by rush orders. In
Korea in the 1970s, a male superior could literally enslave women workers
to his whims with the threat of spreading the word that they were not vir-
gins. Male supervisors’ profit-oriented goals and patriarchal cultural norms
emphasizing female chastity have created many silent sufferers on South
Korean shop floors. The Dong-Il Textile case reveals that the management
and the male workers used the threat of sexual violence as a means to con-
trol women’s work. Women workers used vague terms in describing sexual
violence, such as “sub-human violence and curses,” “animalistic actions,”
“actions too horrendous to talk about,” or “deeds too mean to describe.”
The cultural embeddedness of a taboo topic such as sexual violence legiti-
mates these vague descriptions as valid claims (Cho, Yeo, and Yi, 1989). The
Dong-Il Textile case illustrates the calculated tactic of sexual violence as a
means to control women’s work.
South Korean women workers, the motor of the nation’s successful EOI,
experienced a multifaceted and rigorous labor control system. The state, the
unions, and the capitalists all played a part in depriving women of their
rights. Yet in the face of these debilitating control mechanisms, the women
workers rebelled. Their resistance suggests that there must have been coun-
tervailing mechanisms of empowerment and consciousness-raising.
Ironically, the detrimental structural transformation in the rapid EOI
process shaped women’s critical consciousness, leading to their activism.
THE RISE OF SOUTH KOREAN WOMEN WORKERS’ CLASS AND GENDER
CONSCIOUSNESS
South Korea’s women-initiated labor strikes reveal the existence of
women’s autonomous consciousness. In spite of the controlling capitalist-
patriarchy ideology, South Korean women rebelled. In theorizing about
women’s resistance, Giddens’s theory of the “dialectics of control” is valu-
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able. Although Giddens does not specifically mention gender, his theory
grants more power to a marginal social group by recognizing its “knowl-
edgeability” and “capability.” Structure is not deterministic because human
actors retain autonomy through the awareness of the unjust workings of a
society (Giddens, 1979). The reciprocity between structure and agency
makes an analysis of women workers’ consciousness building and empow-
erment more dynamic and less deterministic.
Giddens’s theory of human action differentiates between two types of
consciousness: discursive and practical. Supplying reasons or “giving
accounts” is the discursive capabilities of an actor who connects “stocks of
knowledge” to action. Practical consciousness is tacit knowledge that is
employed in conduct, but the actor is not able to formulate the reasons dis-
cursively. Practical consciousness assumes that an actor knows a rule, or
knows how to apply the rules to actions (Giddens, 1982). Thus, actions
themselves reflect the existence of awareness. Giddens’ actors are equipped
with historical sensibilities. He writes that: “The knowledgeability of human
agents in given historical circumstances is always bounded, by the unac-
knowledged conditions of an action on one side, and by its unintended con-
sequences on the other” (Giddens, 1982: 180). Human actors are also aware
of the socio-historical context in which they are situated; they can therefore
provide insights into the causes of their activism.
Women’s resistance does not occur in vacuum. It is rather a byproduct of
multiple causes that link consciousness to action in the background of
macro culture and personal environment. I will express this dynamic in the
following equation: R= f (MC, PE, C). In other words, R (resistance) is the
function of MC (macro context), PE (personal environment), and C (con-
sciousness). According to this equation, South Korean women engaged in
dialectical exchanges with macro structural context (e.g., the increase in
their labor market participation and rapid urbanization) and their personal
environment (e.g., change of identity from farmers to factory workers). The
young women who were formerly dependent on their parents became
responsible not only for themselves, but for their families as well. Their
wage earning status deprived them of the social protection that they
enjoyed prior to factory employment. Within a very short period of time,
South Korean women experienced an abrupt transformation of their lives.
When these drastic changes in macro context and personal environment
were confounded with consciousness raising mechanisms (e.g., camaraderie
and outside support networks), their raised consciousness was translated
into activism. A large number of women from rural areas migrated into the
cities to get factory jobs. After work was found, most women remained in
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factory dormitories. Company-provided dormitories were not only inexpen-
sive, they were also considered safe by parents when compared to other
housing options (Lee, 1990). This spatial concentration of women into com-
munitarian residences meant that they could share their personal and work
experiences with each other. Friendships were formed, and individuation
was replaced by a sense of community (Festinger, Schachter, and Back,
1967). The women’s communitarian living arrangements provided a rich
soil for their cohesiveness before the protests and solidarity during their col-
lective resistance (Kim-Park, 1998).12 The multivariate analysis of South
Korean women’s activism provides a complex and yet realistic explanation
for their resistance. Consciousness in and of itself falls short as a plausible
cause for activism. Resistance does not necessarily mean the existence of
consciousness, and consciousness does not automatically lead to protest.
While South Korean society’s cultural similarities to Taiwan (i.e., patriar-
chal gender norms and patrilinear family structure) cannot provide a plausi-
ble explanation for the manifested differences in women’s activism, an
investigation into structural differences does in fact give us an opening.
Small- and medium-sized firms located in rural areas employed most
Taiwanese women. Taiwanese workers did not have to migrate to get jobs.
They could also maintain close ties with their families. The Taiwanese gov-
ernment’s promotion of small-sized firms implied that the women workers
could receive more on-the-job training, which was useful for their career
mobility. The opposite was true in the Korean experience. The social isola-
tion experienced by Korean women is considered more severe than that of
Taiwanese women. The “class structuration” of Korean women occurred as
a consequence of their dialectical interplay with the economy’s structural
transformation, which had severely detrimental implications for their lives.
CONCLUSION
Labor activism by women workers in South Korea occurred at a time
when such activity was severely repressed. The state’s tight control of labor
hindered the emergence of an organized labor movement in the 1970s.
Legally organized labor strikes were a virtual impossibility, and the costs of
challenging the anti-labor regime were too substantial to ignore.
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12 In her case study of Dong-Il Textile labor strikes, Kim-Park (1998) has found that women
workers’ communal living spaces such as factory dormitories were sites where women’s simi-
lar life paths and daily experiences converged into friendship ties and a sense of collective
identity. In times of collective action, the factory dormitories served as informal communica-
tion networks, making mobilization possible.
Nevertheless, South Korean women’s labor activism did emerge, interrupt-
ing an era of labor quiescence in the 1970s. Most of the labor protests of this
period occurred in peripheral industries such as textile, garment, and wig
manufacturing. Labor protests occurred at firms with labor-intensive, low
skill, and low job security employment. The absolute majority of the strikers
at such companies were women workers. Their male colleagues in many
cases largely ignored women workers’ labor struggles, and men rarely
joined the strikes.
The global economy and its international division of labor have had a sig-
nificant impact on women’s lives in developing economies. The expansion
of capitalism on a global scale and the preexisting social norm of patriarchy
are mutually reinforcing. Women’s lives undergo fundamental changes dur-
ing large scale societal transformations. Women are the primary source of
cheap and easily exploitable labor, a situation which helps developing
economies to maintain their competitive edges in global restructuring.
Women’s socio-economic status relative to men’s is usually diminished in
the process of development, despite the increases in their gainful employ-
ment (Boserup, 1970; Ward, 1986). In South Korea, rapid urbanization,
inequitable distribution of wealth, and the rapid increase of female partic-
ipation in the workforce had important implications for women’s lives.
Labor control mechanisms of the state and corporate management practices,
such as anti-labor legislation and co-opted labor unions were debilitating.
Patriarchal management practices on the factory floor lowered women’s
work status further. Women’s lives thus intersected with the macro-structur-
al transformations in the economy. South Korean women rebelled against
these abrupt and drastic changes in their lives.
Women have long been perceived as “apolitical.” Women’s activism has
been repressed, discouraged, and missing from mainstream scholarly
accounts. Social activism has been regarded as male territory. Presumably
masculine virtues such as assertiveness, aggressiveness, and dominance
have been seen as the crucial elements in socio-political activities (Brenner,
Laslett, and Arat, 1995). This view of activism as male territory blocks our
ability to see forms of collective action by women, and our tendency to label
those we do see as anomalous. However, more and more studies are refut-
ing women’s “apolitical” stance (Taylor and Whittier, 1998). Women’s pas-
sivity is not inherent in an immutable socio-cultural stance. A growing body
of evidence points out that women shape their consciousness and action
schema through dialectical exchanges in the socio-historical contexts in
which they live (Collins, 1990). The case of South Korean women is an addi-
tion to the literature that challenges conventional sociological understand-
96 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY 
ings of women and activism.
The intensity of South Korean women workers’ labor protests stands in
sharp contrast to stereotypical images of submissive Asian women workers.
The incidents of women workers’ labor resistance strongly illustrate Korean
women’s largely overlooked consciousness as women workers. I argue
against claims of the anomaly of South Korean women’s labor activism.
These claims reflect the stereotyping of Asian women as docile and submis-
sive. This passivity is a cultural mystique that is incongruent with empirical
reality. “Militant,” “radical,” and other masculine descriptions given to the
South Korean women’s activism suggest that Asian women have been
stereotyped by “Western eyes” (see Mohanty, 1991; Spivak, 1987). Instead of
searching for evidence that confirms stereotypes, we need to stretch our per-
ceptual horizons to reality “as is.” South Korean women’s labor activism is a
good point at which to begin.
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